Introduction
The common narrative about treaties is rather one-dimensional. Both treaties and their legal regime are meant to be formal. First, treaties themselves, albeit possibly made through non-formal processes, are usually construed as formal instruments meant to regulate a given aspect of international life. Second, and more fundamentally, the making, identification, validation, application, interpretation, modification and termination of treaties are regulated by a set of formal constraints meant to formally organize various aspects of their existence and functioning. In that sense, treaty law is traditionally perceived as a toolbox providing instruments for the formal translation of the exercise of public authority at the international level. 1 Treaty law thus contrasts with customary law, which in some ways could be seen as the realm of laissez-faire.
This contribution aims to show that the law of treaties can be read very differently, and that the dominance of formalism in treaty law is much more nuanced and qualified than the general perception sketched out in the preceding paragraph suggests. It will be argued that from its making to its termination, a treaty see-saws between formalism and flexibility, and that the body of rules designed by international lawyers to regulate the life of treaties mirrors this constant oscillation: the law of treaties, as codified in the two
II. Formalism and Flexibility as Power-Delegating Structures
The following paragraphs aim to spell out what is meant by formalism -i.e. formal structures of thought -and flexibility in the design of some of the secondary rules pertaining to international treaties. For the purpose of the arguments made here, formalism means the erection of formal structures within which the creation, identification/validation and application/interpretation of a treaty must be carried out.
Formalism entails that these three operations will function against the backdrop of a set of predefined standards, thereby limiting the leeway of the makers, addressees, interpreters or observers of a treaty. These standards may be mostly procedural (at the making stage), cognitive (at the identification stage) or hermeneutic (at the application stage). In themselves, these standards do not dictate a particular result for any of these three operations, as such a result cannot be predicted by the law of treaties. Yet, the formal standards therein set formal limits as to what these operations can generate. In that sense, formalism in treaty law does not provide predictability as to what kind of regulation is contained within a treaty. It does not dictate how treaty must be made, identified and validated or applied and interpreted. Instead, formalism provides a surface of predictability for the users and consumers of treaty law as to what cannot be achieved by these three operations. Thus, the predictability provided by formalism as it is understood here is negative. These constraints, formally imposed on the creation, identification/validation, and application/interpretation of treaty, are all informed by the presupposition that such formal standards provide a firmer basis for coherence in treaty making. In their absence, treaty law, as a tool for international regulation and governance, may be seen as lacking any distinct value as a regulatory instrument over other sources of rules.
On the other hand, flexibility, as it is understood here, is based on the delegation of power to the maker, the addressee, the observer or the interpreter of the treaty. It presupposes that each of these actors will have the ability to competently address questions of making, identification/validation or application/interpretation that may arise in the life of a treaty.
Flexibility is thus premised on the idea that such answers are not knowable in abstracto 4 and cannot be anticipated by the law of treaties. Further, even if they could be known and predicted, it is not appropriate that they are. Flexibility thus shies away from attempting to predict what will happen during the creation, identification/validation or application/interpretation stages. It transfers the burden of predicting any outcomes to the makers, addressees, interpreters or observers of the treaty. It is thus a form of regulation characterized by laissez-faire and, as a result, allows for the constant adjustment of an agreement to ensure its survival in a constantly changing environment.
The use of the term flexibility in this chapter should be distinguished from semantic flexibility within the text of the treaty itself. Indeed, the words and phrasing contained within a treaty text can be vague in varying degrees. The reasons for this vagueness can be reduced to several categories. It can be ordinary -i.e. inherent in the indeterminacy of language -, transparent -i.e. intentionally indeterminate, as this is the limit of the consensus that was reached during negotiations or to award a greater leeway for interpretation to the authority applying the treaty -or, as legal philosophers have termed it, 'extravagant'. 3 Any one of these categories of vagueness, when present in the text of a treaty, brings about semantic flexibility, especially at the level of application/interpretation. This type flexibility is of only indirect concern in this chapter.
Certainly, semantic flexibility raises questions of indeterminacy, and these will be touched upon in section 4. However, the focus here is on the tension between formalism and flexibility in techniques designed by the law of treaties to address semantic flexibility, and not on semantic flexibility itself.
The choice of more or less formalism or flexibility in treaty making is sometimes made consciously and at other times it is not. In some instances it is the result of a political choice for more formal constraints or, conversely, for more laissez-faire. This choice is never one-dimensional or absolute. The rigidity associated with the law of treaties can be alleviated by flexible mechanisms, whilst the uncertainty inherent in flexibility (particularly with regard to the delegation of power) is allayed by the inclusion of formal structures. At the same time, it is important to note that the balance between formalism and flexibility is itself the result of internal systemic dynamics and evolves with the practice of those authorities in charge of the interpretation and application of treaties.
Indeed flexibility can be self-generated, and the balance between formalism and flexibility may not always stem from a conscious decision. This is why the oscillations between formalism and flexibility found in the making, identification/validation and application/interpretation of treaties are inherently variable. The following paragraphs will confirm this.
III. Formalism and Flexibility in the Making (and Unmaking) of Treaties
In international law, the process by which rules are made can be formalized. 4 This is usually manifested by resort to compulsory formal procedures. If such procedures are not respected, the norm in question will be deprived of legal effect. In the design of the law of treaties, it could have potentially been decided that international treaty-making abide by a strictly formal procedure. In this framework, the existence and validity of the treaty would be determined, inter alia, by reference to whether this formalized procedure had been respected by the contracting parties. The drafters of Vienna Conventions decided not to follow this particular course. First, oral agreements have been left outside the scope of the Vienna Conventions, are governed by customary international law and are not subject to any specific procedural requirements. By their nature, oral agreements are entered into as a result of informal processes. Second, even for written agreements, treaty-making has not been made subject to any formal procedure. The expression of individual consent and the meeting of all individual consents can generate a valid treaty falling within the scope of the Vienna Conventions, irrespective of the process of their expression. Indeed, for written treaties there is also great flexibility as to how a text can be authenticated, as the parties themselves determine the authentication process. 5 Likewise, an expression of consent can be done through one of the various modes suggested by the Vienna Conventions or 'any other means if so agreed'. 6 The regime of the Vienna Conventions in respect of the making of treaties is inherently flexible. It does not require that the method of expressing consent be subject to strict formal procedures but rather provides some signposts or suggestions as to how this may be carried out. It is interesting to note that in early debates within the International Law Commission, the necessity of codifying the conclusion and adoption process was not deemed to be necessary.
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There is certainly a degree of healthy pragmatism behind this laissez-faire approach, and the flexibility of the Vienna Conventions themselves. Indeed, it would have been detrimental to the success of the Conventions if too formal a procedure for treaty-making had been imposed, as it could potentially discourage subjects of international law from translating their agreements into treaties falling within the ambit of the Conventions. In that sense, the flexibility regarding treaty-making found in the law of treaties can be seen to promote the appeal of treaty law as a method for concluding international agreements in general.
Albeit primarily flexible, the regulation of international treaty-making under the Vienna Conventions contains some aspects which have been subject to formal standardization. It is necessary to mention here some important qualifications, as these endeavours to formalize certain dimensions of treaty-making remain modest and continue to allow for the possibility of more flexible options agreed by parties to prevail.
1. The definition of the powers of the delegates in charge of adopting or authenticating a treaty has been formalized. 8 The infringement of such formal standards can deprive an act relating to the conclusion of a treaty of legal effect, when performed by a person who cannot be considered to represent the State in question. 9 Such an infringement can even lead to the invalidity of a treaty in the 5. Some treaties are adopted through the decision-making procedures, and by virtue of instruments, of international organizations. In this case, the treaty-making process is -partly -subject to the formal procedure of the organization concerned. Secretariat of the United Nations. 33 It is precisely this non-formal character in their creation, especially at the domestic level, that entices States to conclude such agreements.
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In the light of the foregoing, it appears reasonable to assert that treaty-making, albeit occasionally subject to formal standards, remains largely flexible. The dimensions of treaty-making that have been subject to formal standardization are limited and largely leave open the possibility for parties to agree on more flexible options. Thus, as far as the making of treaties is concerned, parties enjoy considerable leeway as to how they organize their negotiations, express their consent or make reservations.
Although the present chapter is not concerned with modification or termination, it is interesting to note that the flexibility paradigm which dominates the making of treaties also produces effects in the modification and termination processes. In the case of modification of treaties, for instance, it is widely acknowledged that subsequent practice can alter the effects of treaties. 35 By the same token, it is accepted that a treaty which establishes a boundary can be modified by a non-formal act. 36 In the case of termination, a non-formal action can sometimes be deemed to terminate a treaty even in the presence of a formal termination procedure. 37 Further, behaviour at odds with treaty prescriptions can in some instances lead to termination, even in the presence of a formal termination procedure. 38 As modification and termination are the subject of other chapters of this work, they will not be further expanded on here. It suffices to show that the flexibility that informs the regulation of treaty-making can also dominate the 'unmaking' of treaties.
IV. Formalism and Flexibility in the Identification of Treaties
The identification of a treaty is the operation whereby an international agreement is identified as a treaty proper and thus as belonging to the international legal order. It is as a result of this identification that an agreement becomes subject to the secondary rules of the international legal order pertaining to the law of treaties. It is also by virtue of such identification that the treaty produces primary rules within that legal order. Identification of a rule as a legal rule simultaneously entails a process of validation. Because validity is the specific form of existence of rules 39 , identifying a treaty amounts to validating it.
Identification and validation are thus intertwined operations, and they rest on the same equilibrium between formalism and validity. The following paragraphs will thus engage simultaneously with questions of identification and validation.
If a treaty is invalid, it ceases to belong to the international legal order and its membership of this legal order is retroactively terminated. Some of the reasons for retroactive termination are a direct reflection of the main treaty-identification parameter, belong, or ever have belonged, to the international legal order. 40 Not all the grounds of invalidity are related to intention and consent. 41 This section only focusses on the balance struck between formalism and flexibility in the processes of identification and validation and does not deal with the invalidity of treaties in any broader sense.
As a preliminary remark, it should be stated that the fact that the regime of treaty-making is primarily informed by flexibility does not automatically entail that the identification of treaties is equally flexible. Indeed, an agreement can originate in a very non-formal process and still be identified as a treaty using formal criteria. Conversely, an agreement that has been elaborated by virtue of a very formal procedure may be subject to a nonformal identification process, that is can be ascertained by virtue of non-formal indicators. In that sense, formalism and flexibility at the law-making level are intrinsically separate from formalism and flexibility at the identification level.
It is truistic to say that the parties to a treaty make a norm and elevate it into a conventional legal rule to achieve a given purpose. According to mainstream treaty theory, a norm that has been agreed on and enshrined in a treaty is classically called the both the content and the formal container. 43 In terms of treaty identification, it is essential to point out that both the content and container can potentially indicate whether the norm in question is an international legal rule. It goes without saying that such a possibility does not exist for oral treaties; whose identification is intended to be entirely flexible and non-formal. The following paragraphs accordingly solely address written treaties, as the existence of an instrumentum makes it possible for formalism to play a role in the identification-process.
Theoretically speaking, a written agreement's membership of the international legal order could be determined by either a pre-defined content (negotium) or a pre-defined type of container (instrumentum). This means that identification could be made either flexibly or formally. If it were made dependent on the substance on the norm, the identification process would leave it to the fluctuating substantive content of the agreement to elevate it to the status of an international agreement. On the other hand, if it is the written instrument that determines an agreement's membership of the international legal order, the identification process could be considered as being primarily formalistic.
According to mainstream theory, the decisive criterion in the identification of treaties is never found in the negotium but only in the instrumentum. In particular, the formulation of clear obligations is not considered a constitutive element of any legal act. 44 The The foregoing demonstrates the dominant role played by formalism in treatyidentification on the surface. It is argued here, however, that this is as far as the role of formalism extends in the identification of a treaty. Indeed, even though the this model of formal law-identification, based on the instrumentum, lays down an adequate framework for the identification of written treaties, this identification remains ultimately dependent on the intention of the authors of these agreements. As a result, as is explained below, formalism in the treaty-identification process yields to flexibility.
It is well established that the identification yardstick provided by the first Vienna Against this backdrop, suggestions have been made to abandon intent as a criterion in the identification of treaties. 60 The author of this chapter has himself attempted to devise a new framework to construe the sources of international law in a dynamic fashion, grounded in the practices of law-applying authorities, which would overcome the difficulties inherent in the flexibility associated with intention as the decisive criterion in the identification of a treaty. 61 Such propositions, however, have yet to be endorsed and substantiated by international legal scholarship or law-applying authorities. Until that occurs, it seems that identification of treaties will continue to be informed by flexibility, despite the formal trappings provided by the general theory of treaty-identification.
V. Formalism and Flexibility in the Application and Interpretation of Treaties
Stating that there cannot be any application of treaties without interpretation is extremely mundane. 62 Indeed, it is uncontested that those authorities empowered to apply international treaties must inevitably interpret them. Treaty-application is primarily about confronting a conventional rule with facts. 63 As a result, applying the treaty to the specific facts of each case requires an operation of interpretation which constructs a specific meaning for a particular rule for the specific situation to which it is applied. This is also why treaty-application and interpretation are not operations on which judges have a monopoly. Indeed, both legal scholars and addressees of treaties themselves are similarly engaged in the application and interpretation of treaties.
In terms of the argument put forward in this chapter, it is important to highlight that treaty-interpretation is ubiquitous and follows any attempt to apply a legal rule contained within a treaty to a factual situation. Interpretation, and thus the determination of a treaty's content in order to establish a standard of behaviour for a particular situation, simultaneously empowers the interpreter who is placed in a very unique position. This can be explained as follows.
Stating that the indeterminacy of ordinary language has contaminated the language of treaties is utterly unremarkable. Indeterminacy commonly stems from the openness of the ordinary language through which rules in treaties are expressed. Likewise, treaty rules, being the product of human thought, 64 are beset by ambiguities. These ambiguities may have been desired because they were the only manner in which the (absence of) consensus reached during negotiations could be translated into a written agreement. They could also manifest a deliberate delegation of powers of interpretation to the lawapplying authority. 65 Whatever the foundations of the indeterminacy in the content of treaties, what it is important to highlight here is that, as a result of such indeterminacy, treaty application and interpretation are necessarily accompanied by a wide discretionary power for the authority in charge of carrying out these functions.
Whilst both the flexibility and wide discretion of law-applying authorities are necessary to preserve the meaningfulness of treaties when applied to factual situations 66 , it is not surprising that this discretionary power is subject to checks and formal constraints. In general, the drafters of treaties have attempted to restrict the powers of judges and other law-applying authorities as much as possible. The restriction of the discretionary powers of law-applying authorities has been seen as indispensable to the preservation of their legitimacy.
Attempts to constrain the powers of law-applying authorities has traditionally amounted attempts to formalize and standardize their legal reasoning. More specifically, attempts to formalize the rationality of law-application and to constrain law-applying authorities' powers has usually meant the elaboration of rules of interpretation that guide contentdetermination by these authorities. It is this attempt that has given rise to the rules of interpretation found in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Conventions, 67 which have now come to be viewed as reflecting customary international law and are frequently resorted to by courts and tribunals in practice. 68 This is not to say that there were no standards of 21 interpretation before the Vienna Conventions. Themselves informed by earlier scholarly work 69 , the formal standards of interpretation prescribed by the Vienna Conventions came to replace the sovereignty-protective principles of interpretation devised by international courts in the first half of the 20 th century 70 by a toolbox of formal principles. 71 Needless to say, the elaboration of formal standards of interpretation was not an easy enterprise. Such an achievement -which was deemed a miracle 72 -was particularly painstaking work due to the difficulty in striking the subtle balance between the necessity to preserve flexibility in treaty application and interpretation on one hand, and the necessity of constraining the powers of law-applying authorities (by formal standardization of their legal reasoning) on the other. 73 The final balance struck by
Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Conventions is thus the result of the tension and interaction between the opposing logics of flexibility and formalism.
The existence of formal rules of interpretation makes the application and interpretation of treaties, at least on the surface, a formal operation. Indeed, the existence of such principles shrouds these operations with a veil of formalism. These rules purport to provide a formal methodology for the interpretation of international legal rules. 74 They are grounded in the idea that there is an inherent objective intelligibility and rationality in the logic of treaty-application. 75 They convey what one could describe as a 'Montesquian myth of textualism' 76 , sometimes supplemented by internationalist and purpositivist techniques, equating the interpretation of treaties with textual mining -that is, extracting an idea or rule from the text which exists objectively. In contrast to treaty-making and treaty-identification, formalism, at least on thus surface, seems to dominate treatyapplication and treaty-interpretation.
This is however as far as formalism has penetrated treaty application and interpretation.
Indeed, the interpretation and application of treaties shows far more flexibility in practice. treaty-application -shows how flexibility has remained unchallenged despite the attempts to formally standardize both the application and interpretation of law. 87 Through these scholarly movements, the idea that the application of treaties is made behind a veil of ignorance has been severely undermined. is uncovered and made transparent, other modes of legitimation in judicial decisionmaking will be needed to sustain the authority of courts and tribunals. 89 This is likely why theories of interpretation continue to flourish in international legal scholarship. 90 The foregoing has attempted to demonstrate that, to a far greater extent than in the making or identification of treaties, it is the application and interpretation of treaties that serves to magnify the dynamic tensions between formalism and flexibility. The constant oscillation between the necessity for legitimization through the formal constraint of the powers of law-applying authorities, and the necessity of preserving flexibility to allow treaties to remain normatively meaningful, makes the equilibrium between formalism and flexibility here the most dynamic of the three examined in this study.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The statement that international law is the continuation of the struggle of politics by more civilized means 91 is nowadays an uncontroversial assertion. It is generally accepted that international law brings about a displacement, rather than a neutralization, of the political confrontations in the international arena. Such a displacement of politics is carried out by virtue of a wide variety of different means.
Treaty law certainly constitutes one attempt to displace politics. Indeed, treaty law seeks to stabilize agreements reached among the main international actors by virtue of a formal standardization of (some aspects of) the making, identification, application and interpretation thereof. As indicated above, it does not dictate how treaties must be made, identified and validated or applied and interpreted, but provides a formal surface of predictability for the users and consumers of treaty law as to what cannot be achieved with these three operations. In that sense, like any formalization of politics 92 , the type of formalism found in treaty law can be understood as an endeavour to control the making, identification, application and interpretation of norms through abstract categories. Treaty law should be seen as nothing more than a formal norm-management instrument.
It is important to realize that, albeit resting on an effort to formalize -to varying extentsthe making, identification, application and interpretation of treaties, treaty law, like any other attempts to displace politics, does not seek to stifle it completely. On the contrary, politics survives on the formal surface in flexibility-friendly spaces, permitting the constant adjustment of the agreement and ensuring its survival in a constantly changing environment. In other words, in treaty law, politics are internalized in spaces which have been specifically designated for that purpose. In such pockets of flexibility provided by the Vienna Conventions, the law of treaties operates to delegate power to the maker, addressee, observer or interpreter of the treaty. This is well illustrated by the three dimensions of treaty law addressed in this chapter.
It is true that the creation of (or systemic self-generation of) pockets of flexibility found in the law of treaties can also be seen in other areas of international law, for example international adjudication 93 or the rules of international responsibility. 94 This means that, when it comes to preserving flexibility, the law of treaties behaves in a similar manner to other secondary rules of international law. The previous sections have demonstrated that, with regard to the law of treaties, the articulation between the formal surface for the 'domestication' of politics and the pockets of flexibility is particularly variable in practice. Indeed, as this study has attempted to demonstrate, the equilibrium between formalism and flexibility in treaty-making, treaty-identification and treaty-application varies considerably. For each of these dimensions of the life of a treaty, formalism and flexibility strike different balances and fluctuate according to disparate dynamics.
Furthermore, the balance between flexibility and formalism found in each of these dimensions of the law of treaties is also unstable and subject to constant variation.
In conclusion it is argued that the complexity of the equilibrium between formalism and flexibility is symptomatic of the nature of the law of treaties. It is a manifestation of the very special nature of this branch of international law. In that sense, the complex, unstable and dynamic articulation between formalism and flexibility found in the law of treaties is anything but surprising. Indeed, it is the view of this author that the law of treaties boils down to an agglomeration of secondary rules which are of very different natures. Put simply, treaty law is primarily a composite set encompassing both rules of change 95 and, to a very limited extent, rules of adjudication 96 . This set of rules is remarkably heterogeneous, and far more so than other sets of secondary rules found in international law. 97 It is in this context that the intricate, multi-layered nature of the
